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Can Action Be Explained Mechanistically?
William Hasker

It would not be far from the truth to say that the confrontation between the
Manifest Image and the Scientific Image of man is the central issue of modern
philosophy. And a persisting theme in this confrontation is the question how
human behavior is to be explained. Brushing aside finer distinctions, the main
alternatives are "mechanistic" explanations in terms of the physical states of the
organism and causal laws relating these states, and "intentional" explanations
in which an action is said to have occurred because it was intended, purposed,
or desired. Mechanistic explanations of the most significant aspects of human
behavior are at present more a hope (though not necessarily a forlorn or remote
hope) than an actuality. Intentional explanations, on the other hand, are readily
available and we use them constantly in everyday life ("The neighbor came to
the door in order to pay the rent"). but whether they are suitable, even when
sharpened and refined, to become part of a science of human behavior is in the
highest degree controversial.
At present, then, we are not in a position to carry out a comparison of actual
mechanistic and intentional explanations of the same piece of behavior, in order
to see which has the most to offer a science of behavior. But failing this there
are still many interesting and important philosophical questions which can be
raised concerning these two types of explanations. One such question is whether
or not mechanistic and intentional explanations are compatible-whether, that is,
the same piece of behavior can have both a true mechanistic explanation and a
true intentional explanation, or whether the existence of a true explanation of
one of these types precludes there being a true explanation of the other type.
Charles Taylor, in his book The Explanation of Behaviour, argues for the latter
alternative: "The claim that a system is purposive," he says, "is a claim about
the laws holding at the most basic level of explanation." l The notion of the
"basic" level of explanation is explained as follows :
If explanation is conceived here as explanation in terms of a functional
law, then an explanation can be considered as less basic than another
when the regularities which the laws cited in the first describe are themselves explained in terms of the laws cited in the second. Thus if the
behaviour of a system can be explained by the laws y=fJ(z) and laws
y=f ,(x), where 'x' and 'z' range over different domains, we can call the
second explanation more basic if the fact that laws y=fJ(z) hold of the
system can be explained in terms of y=f2(X) . (Taylor, [5] p. 18)
Taylor correctly notes that "this claim to have reached the rock bottom of ex-
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planation is not one which is usually made in scientific theory, the possibility
always being left open, however unlikely it may seem, that another set of laws will
be discovered which are more basic" (Taylor, [5] p. 21). And the consequences of
this claim in the present context are indeed far-reaching. When I say that my
neighbor came to the door to pay the rent I am giving an intentional explanation
of his behavior, and if this explanation is true, then by Taylor's principle it follows that no more basic non-intentional explanation is possible. This means, for
instance, that true and complete explanations of his behavior in terms of the laws
of physics, chemistry, and/or neurophysiology simply do not exist. Conversely,
if a successful neurophysiological explanation of my neighbor'S behavior were
found, and if such explanations were extended to cover all other human behavior,
then it would follow that no intentional explanation of human behavior-i.e., no
statement such as "He came to the door in order to pay the rent"-could ever be
true. In other words, the confirmation of such a neurophysiological theory would
compel the abandonment, or at least the radical modification, of our customary way
of explaining human behavior.
Now, whether or not one regards such abandonment or modification as conceivable? it is clear that Taylor's view places a heavy burden on the advocates of
"mechanistic" explanations of human behavior. In particular it creates a difficult
position for the behavioral scientist, who must of necessity rely upon intentional
explanations as (at least) heuristic aids for constructing the very theories which, if
they are successful, will eventually show the intentional explanations to be false
one and all. To be sure, we may all occasionally be in the position of having to kick
down a ladder after we have climbed up it, but only a lover of paradox could
happily adopt this as a deliberate strategy. Thus we are led to examine Taylor's
reasons for his claim. 3
These reasons may best be appreciated by imagining a situation in which a
complete mechanistic explanation of behavior was actually available. Suppose, for
example, that cybernetics research and neurophysiology have proceeded hand in
hand to the point where the fact that a human organism is behaving in a particular way
can be accounted for by the way it has been programmed, the correlation
between this programming and this behaviour being an instance of some
general law. In this way the behaviour can be accounted for by this law or
laws, which constitute a level of explanation more basic than our everyday
account since we shall now be able to derive our observed correlations
between behaviour and its antecedent conditions from this law (Taylor,
[5] p. 40).
Now, how would we go about applying the concept of "intention" in this situation? The most likely way to do this would be to identify the intention with the
programming condition that leads to the behavior, together with certain conscious
phenomena which are correlated with the programming condition. (The latter is
my addition, and is needed if we are to accommodate the fact that we are (normally) introspectively aware of our intentions, but otherwise does not materially
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affect Taylor's argument.) Thus, we could still say that my neighbor is at the door
because he intends to pay the rent, and add that the intention in question can be
given a fuller and more adequate description in neurophysiological terms.
But Taylor claims that the concept of intention as thus applied would be decisively different from our ordinary concept, and that my neighbor's coming to
the door would no longer be "action" in the ordinary sense. His arguments in
support of this claim are complex, and a full discussion would require far more
space than is available here. But the most important of them center around the
contention that whereas in our hypothetical situation the relation between "intentions" and behavior is logically contingent, the relation between intentions in
the ordinary sense and behavior is non-contingent.
The notion that in our ordinary conceptual scheme the relation between intention and behavior is non-contingent hinges on the logical status of what may be
termed the "Principle of Intention," which can be formulated as follows: "If someone intends to do something, and has the opportunity to do it, then, ceteris paribus,
he does it." "Ceteris paribus" here is most helpfully translated, not as "other things
being equal," but as "if there are no interfering factors," where interfering factors
would include such things as physical interference which prevents the intention
from being carried out, other intentions and desires which, in the given situation,
conflict with the first, or temporary abnormal states of the organism due to disease,
drugs, etc. Now if the ceteris paribus clause is included, the Principle of Intention
stated above is a conceptual truth, and this is what is meant by saying that the
relation between intention and behavior is non-contingent. In our hypothetical
situation, on the other hand, the "intention" is identified with the programming
condition, and is therefore linked to the behavior by the same logically contingent
laws of nature which link the programming condition to the behavior.4 Thus in
our hypothetical situation the "intention" becomes a causal antecedent of behavior
linked to it by contingent laws of nature-which is not the case with our ordinary
concept of intention.
The significance of this comes out more clearly if we notice that, in our hypothetical situation, the relation between intention and behavior depends on (since
it is in part identical with) the relation between programming condition and behavior. With our ordinary concept of intention, on the other hand,
Because the fact that the behavior follows from the intention other
things being equal is not a contingent fact, we cannot account for this fact
by more basic laws. For to explain a fact by more basic laws is to give the
regularities on which this fact causally depends . But not being contingent,
the dependence of behaviour on intention is not contingent on anything,
and hence not on any such regularities . .. If we introduce a more basic
law governing movement B=f(p), this can only be compatible with the
behaviour being brought about by the intention (I) if 1-B can be derived
from B=f(p). But 1-B cannot be derived from anything, for it is not a
contingent correlation. It follows that our accounting for behaviour by a
law governing movement is incompatible with its being brought about by
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the intention or purpose concerned, and therefore with its being action in
the usual sense of the term (Taylor, [5] p. 44).
In order to unravel this argument it will be helpful to recall Donald Davidson's
statement that "The truth of a causal statement depends on what events are
described; its status as analytic or synthetic depends on how the events are
described" (Davidson, [2] p. 696). For instance, "suppose 'A caused B' is true. Then
the cause of B
A; so, substituting, we have 'The cause of B caused B: which is
analytic." To take a less trivial example, it is surely arguable that "If I turn on
the light switch, then, ceteris paribus, the light will go on"5 is a conceptual truth,
although the laws of physics which make lights and switches possible are logically
contingent.
Taylor's argument does serve, however, to indicate a significant difference between intentions, purposes, desires, etc. and ordinary (physical) causal antecedents.
The difference lies in this: When we describe a physical cause in terms (such as
"the cause of B") which link it logically to its effect, we are usually prepared to
replace this description with a "neutral" description under which the relation between cause and effect is synthetic. (My turning on the light switch is my pushing
a certain small lever, etc.) But for purposes, intentions, desires, etc., we do not
have in common use any such neutral alternative descriptions. The reasons for
this are doubtless complex, and include facts about the way we learn what someone's purposes are as well as facts about the ends which are served by talk about
purposes. Still, it is worth noting that we sometimes provide a "stand-in" for such
a neutral description on an ad hoc basis: "If Charles continues in his present state
of mind, he is going to hurt someone." Here Charles' present state of mind may
include intentions, purposes, or desires which, if specified, would provide a noncontingent link with the predicted behavior, but the statement as it stands is contingent. If, on the other hand, the envisioned neurophysiological theory were actually to become available, we should know how to provide an appropriate neutral
description for any "intentional" state whatever.
There is no reason, then, why the same two events may not be linked by two
distinct laws or principles, one of which is logically contingent while the other is
not. But, Taylor may still ask, how can the correlation of intention and behavior,
which is not contingent, depend on or be derived from the "more basic" natural
laws connecting programming conditions and behavior? The fact that the same
question could be asked about the light switch should keep us from being too
worried. But to answer directly: the problem arises only because Taylor has made
an oversimplified application of his "more basic-less basic" relation. That one
law is more basic than another need not, and usually does not, mean that the
second is logically derived from the first. In the case at hand, what the more
basic neurophysiological laws explain is not the logical connection between intention and behavior, but rather the fact that there are intentions, i.e. personal
states which, ceteris paribus, tend to bring about the behavior which they refer to
or "intend." Thus we may say, in Taylor's own words, that the neurophysiological
theory is more basic than the Principle of Intention, "for the former provides us
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with the conditions in which the latter will apply or not apply, so that we know
how to construct systems exemplifying it, or at least when to predict of any
system that it will exemplify it" (Taylor, [5] p. 19). To be sure, if the subjective
states we now call "intentions" were generally to fail to lead to the "intended"
result, and that for no discernable reason, then our concept of intention would
become inapplicable. That this does not happen is presumably one of those "extremely general facts of nature" on which, according to Wittgenstein, our languagegames depend for their point (Wittgenstein [6] p. 56). But that intentions should
occasionally fail creates no special problem, for we shall continue to deal with it
as we do anyway: sometimes we look harder for interfering factors, sometimes we
surmise such factors without hard evidence, and sometimes we deny that the
intention was really present in the first place. To sum up: The non-contingent link
between intention and behavior is supplied by us when we describe a certain subjective state as an intention; the fact that there are states which can be so described
would be explained, under the envisioned theory, in accordance with the laws of
neurophysiology.
We have not dealt with all of Taylor's arguments, yet I believe it is safe to say
that if those we have examined are not sound the remaining ones will not suffice
to establish his point. I conclude, then, that Taylor has not given good reasons in
support of his claim that action cannot be explained mechanistically.
II

So far we have found no reason to exclude the possibility that action can be
explained mechanistically. Rather than close on this irenic note, however, I proposed to consider a different, though related, argument against the possibility of
mechanism. It is characteristic of human action, not only that it is explained in
terms of intentions, purposes and desires, but also that it is subject to normative
principles of various kinds, which include among others principles of logic and
ethics. Indeed, action is subject to such normative principles in two distinct ways:
it can be evaluated in the light of norms, but it can also be directed by norms. In
Wilfrid Sellars' terminology, these norms are both "rules of criticism" and "rules
of performance."
Now, would a mechanistic explanation of human action be compatible with our
view of such action as subject to norms? I shall argue that it would not-specifically, that mechanism is incompatible with the notion that human action can be
directed by norms, and with the status of these norms as rules of performance. I
believe that the considerations I am about to advance apply with equal force to
both of the above-mentioned categories of normative principles, and perhaps to
others as well. But for reasons which will become apparent, it is the principles of
logic (inductive as well as deductive) which occupy the strategic role. Our question,
then, is whether mechanism is compatible with an adequate account of rational
inference. I shall first give a brief account of the nature of inference, and then
point out the difficulties involved in squaring this account with a mechanistic explanation of behavior.
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The purpose of inference is to enable me, on the basis of beliefs which I already
have, to form further beliefs which are rationally justified. A question, perhaps,
occurs to me, and I set my mind to consider whether any of my present beliefs
provide evidence concerning it. A proposition occurs to me which seems to support
a certain view on the question. As I consider further, I see that the proposition
does indeed constitute rational evidence for a particular answer. That is to say,
I see that the proposition is linked to the answer by a correct principle of inference
(though I do not necessarily formulate this principle explicitly) . A further survey
of my beliefs yields none which would support a contrary answer. So because I
have seen that an answer to my question is supported by evidence according to
correct principles of inference, I accept that answer; it becomes a belief of mine.
And I am rationally justified in doing so.
Now supposing I have gone through such a process of reasoning as described,
how can it fail of its intended result? That is to say, in what ways may my newly
formed belief fail to be rationally justified? First of all, the proposition which I
cite in evidence may itself be one which I am not rationally justified in believing. (In the extreme case, it might be one which I have assumed arbitrarily in
order to provide support for a desired result.) Second, the proposition may not
really support the conclusion-my "principle of inference" may be fallacious.
Third, my principle of inference may be correct, but I may fail to see that it is
correct-I may just be conditioned (or have conditioned myself) to assent to conclusions which follow from evidence according to the principle, without ever
understanding why, or how, the evidence really supports the conclusion. (Many
examples of this are furnished by beginning students in logic and mathematics
courses, who are prone to memorize and apply rules without understanding them.)
Clearly in such a case the process of "reasoning" (if that is the right word!) does
not provide me with rational justification for my conclusion, even though the
conclusion in itself may be fully warranted.6 But finally: Even if my evidence really
supports my conclusion, and I see that it does so, my acceptance of the conclusion
may fail to be justified if it is not because of the supporting evidence that I accept
it. To say this is simply to apply in the context of the rational justification of
belief a point made by Davidson in the context of the moral justification of action:
"Central to the relation between a reason and the action it explains is the idea
that the agent performed the action because he had the reason ... The justifying
role of a reason ... depends upon the explanatory role" (Davidson, [2] pp. 691,
690). The same distinction is involved in Kant's contrast between acts done "from
duty" and those which are merely "in accordance with duty." In other words:
the principles of rational inference (like the principles of moral duty) must be
for us men rules of performance and not merely rules of criticism.
Now, the question we have to answer is this: Can one who believes that action
can be explained mechanistically show how, in accordance with his view, a process
of reasoning can accomplish its purpose of leading to a rationally justified belief?
Or, on the contrary, does mechanism imply that each and every process of reasoning must necessarily fail in one or more of the ways enumerated above? My con-
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tention is, that if mechanism is true, then no process of reasoning can possibly
accomplish its purpose-specifically, that it must fail with respect to the third and
fourth conditions stated above. Let us see why this is so.
To begin with the fourth condition: A mechanist goes through a process of
reasoning and arrives at a conclusion. He is asked, "What is the explanation of
your coming to accept this conclusion?" The answer which must be given, as we
have seen above, is that the conclusion is accepted because it follows from the
evidence in accordance with correct rules of inference. But this is just the answer
which the mechanist cannot give. He must answer: Because this conclusion resulted from the previous state of my brain, functioning in accordance with the
laws of neurophysiology. Thus according to mechanism no one ever accepts a
conclusion because it follows from the evidence.
The mechanist's answer at this point will run something like this: Though the
conclusion reached through reasoning is determined by a causal chain within the
brain which is structured by the laws of neurophysiology, it is a mistake to suppose that the principles of logic have nothing to do with the process. For when
logically correct reasoning actually occurs, this shows that the structure of the
brain is such that its functioning, governed as it is by natural law, nevertheless
brings it about that the conclusion accepted is in fact the one required by the
principles of logic. One may say, then, that the structure of the brain and the laws
of its functioning provide a physical model of the logical laws. This, after all, is
how computers get the results they do. No one doubts that their operation can be
explained mechanistically-and we accept the answers they give us with no qualms
about rational justification.
What is the answer to this answer? First of all, we should keep in mind the
great dissimilarity between the brain and the computer with regard to the reliability
of their results. Not to further malign the "man on the street," who can do
philosophical work without wondering at how frequently even the best of philosophers make mistakes in reasoning? It is true, if we grant for a moment the mechanistic hypothesis, that human brains do sometimes compute logically correct
answers, and some do so in a fairly high percentage of cases-but the brain structure of even a fairly rational human being does not seem to model the principles
of logic with any great reliability. And we are quite unable to examine the neural
circuitry directly in order to determine whether it is properly wired or not. It follows that we need some independent way of checking whether or not a given
inference is correct.
Indeed, the mechanist's answer itself, as well as our discussion of it, presupposes
such an independent check insofar as it speaks of logically "correct" and "incorrect" inferences.? And this is just what we should expect, for his answer
amounts to taking the principles of inference as rules of criticism only, and not
as rules of performance. The way in which reasoning is "performed" is determined
not by the principles of logic but by the causal laws which govern the mechanism
of the brain. Logical thinking is that which happens to coincide with that demanded
by the principles of logic, applied ex post facto in an independent check. But-if
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mechanism is true, how is an independent check possible? It could only be performed by other human beings, which are themselves, by hypothesis, mechanistic
systems-and thus also in need of an independent check to see whether the conclusions computed by their circuitry coincide with those demanded by the principles of inference. Clearly we stand on the brink of a vicious infinite regress.
Clearly, also, the mechanist has not shown how, on his principles, anyone can ever
accept a conclusion because it follows from the evidence.
But there is yet another difficulty for mechanism with regard to the third condition listed above: the requirement that, in order for my conclusion to be justified
for me I must see that it follows from the evidence-in other words, I must see
that the principle of inference is a good one. "See" is used metaphorically, of
course; how shall we unpack it? Clearly, I must at least believe that the principle
is correct. But is this belief in the sense in which belief is contrasted with knowledge? And what must be added to the belief, in order that it should be knowledge?
Taking as our guide the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief, it appears
that what is needed is some sort of rational justification for accepting the principle
of inference. But in what could this consist? Empirical observation of any kind is
out of the question. Possibly the principle of inference can itself be derived from
some other principle or statement- but such derivation will in turn require yet
another principle of inference. And after a very few such steps, we must come
to what will be, for us at any rate , a fundamental principle of inference- one which
cannot be derived from anything outside of itself. The justification of such a principle can only consist in the fact that it is recognized as being correct, and this
recognition must be acknowledged as being self-justifying or self-eviden cing. That
is to say: A person's seeing that a principle is correct must be for him a sufficient
reason for believing it to be correct-rationally, not just psychologically sufficient. 8
And if "see" remains a metaphor, we are at least in a position to understand why
it has always been felt to be the uniquely appropriate metaphor for such fundamental rational insight.
But on the mechanistic hypothesis, what can be made of the claim that the
recognition of a principle of inference is self-evidencing? On that hypothesis
the experience we have called "recognizing that the principle is correct" is
completely explainable in terms of the causal laws governing the functioning of
the nervous system. Whatever the conceptual and/or affective content of that
experience may be, there is absolutely no a priori reason to suppose that it truly
indicates that the principle of inference being considered is a good one. Nor,
on the mechanistic hypothesis, can there be any a posteriori reason to suppose
this, based on an observed correlation between the experience of rational insight
and the occurrence of correct reasoning. For one thing, this would pre-suppose
that we can already recognize instances of good reasoning, which is precisely
what we need rational insight in order to do. For another thing, such an a
posteriori argument would itself require principles of inference-and how would
they in turn be justified?
The result of this argument can be summed up concisely as follows: In order
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for a course of reasoning to justify acceptance of its conclusion, it must include
rational insight into the connection between premises and conclusion, and this
insight must be self-evidencing. But if mechanism is true, rational insight cannot
be self-evidencing. Therefore if mechanism is true, no course of reasoning can
justify acceptance of its conclusion.
This concludes my argument to the effect that mechanism is incompatible with
the notion that human action can be directed by the normative principles of logic.
As stated previously, I believe that parallel arguments could establish similar
conclusions concerning the normative principles of ethics and possibly others
as well. Insofar, then, as it is characteristic of human action that it can be
directed by norms, our argument establishes that not all action can be explained
mechanistically.
Is it conceivable, though, that we should abandon or modify our concept of
action in such a way as to accommodate this consequence? This depends, in part
at least, on what is meant by "conceivable." Certainly there does not seem to be
anything self-contradictory in the notion of a world peopled by sentient
mechanisms which would engage in many of the activities in which human beings
now engage. Insofar, however, as it was true of these mechanisms that their
functioning could not be directed by norms, a number of characteristically human
activities would be pointless. And among these one of the most fascinating, if
not in all other respects the most important, would surely be the activity of
philosophy.
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NOTES
It should be noted that intentional explanations are only a subclass of Taylor's purposive (or

2
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"teleological") explanations; the latter class includes many explanations of, e.g., animal
behavior which are not in the full sense "intentional."
Taylor argues that this is conceivable, while Norman Malcolm argues that it is not (Taylor,
[5) pp. 45-53 ; Malcolm [4» . Atld see the end of Part II below.
Norman Malcolm [4] argues for the same claim for essentially similar reasons; his discussions
are helpful on some points but I do not believe he contributes any arguments fundamentally
different from Taylor's.
Laws of nature, also, may need ceteris paribus clauses in order to exclude possible interfering
factors not covered by the law itself. But the addition of such ceteris paribus clauses has no
tendency to make a law of nature into a conceptual truth.
Here "the light switch" means the switch which turns a particular light on and off, and
"ceteris paribus" excludes such "interfering factors" as there being no power in the line,
there being a short circuit, the bulb's being burnt out, etc.
Of course there might be another chain of reasoning, involving a reference to authority,
which would provide me with at least a measure of justification.
D. M. Armstrong attempts to avoid this by describing "correct" inference in purely causal
terminology. (See [1] , pp. 194ff.) But this attempt is unsuccessful, as has been shown by
R. H. Kane [3].
This does not mean that rational insight must be infallible-but it must be capable of
self-correction.
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